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The Contribution of Justice 





As lawyers, we tend to view majorities and minorities in Supreme 
Court of Canada reasons for judgment in an instrumental and rather 
monolithic way. The law is as the majority of the Court states it. Though 
we may have a fairly good idea about the type of legal materials and 
principles that will be applied by the various members of the Court, our 
impression of the individual justices might be described as peripheral. 
My peripheral impression of Justice Bastarache was that of a solid and 
careful judge who seemed to work very diligently within the bounds of 
existing legal doctrine and I cannot say that I had a clear impression of 
the predilection for the types of legal principles that he would generally 
use to decide a case, except for his coming out swinging in the area of 
language rights. When the haze of stare decisis cleared and I had this 
opportunity to examine his Supreme Court legacy in particular, I was left 
with a confirmation that he was a strong judge who worked thoughtfully 
within established doctrine to clarify it and who tended to choose legal 
principles that advanced the liberal thrust of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms
1
 toward individual liberty and equality. In some 
cases, the tension between principles supporting more collective interests 
becomes quite clear, whether they support specific groups or values such 
as those that structure the traditional family. I was interested to see how 
his approach to doctrine and especially the justification for the breach of 
Charter rights integrated his own thoughtful resolution of the liminal 
issue of the roles of judge and legislator.  
                                                                                                             
*  General Counsel, Human Rights Law Section, Department of Justice (Canada). These are 
the views of the author and not those of the Department of Justice (Canada). I want to thank the 
Canada-U.S. Fulbright Foundation for a scholarship as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard Law School in 
2005. Thanks to Laurie Sargent for her comments on an earlier draft. 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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Justice Bastarache was appointed to the Court as it was on the verge 
of a consensus on a legal standard for implementing the Charter equality 
right
2
 and its statutory analogue, anti-discrimination law.
3
 Though he did 
not write the reasons of the Court setting those standards, his reasons for 
judgment in equality cases show that the legal principles he applied were 
aimed at a strong implementation of the purpose of the right and quite 
demanding of the government in justification of a breach. In discussing 
his contribution to the development of the jurisprudence on equality law, 
I would like to ground my thoughts in what seems to me to be a very 
interesting and appropriate theory for Justice Bastarache‟s work: one that 
theorizes what a judge does when confronted by the task of implementing 
an important, short, broad and value-laden constitutional text, a theory 
that has gained some traction in American academia and one that I came 
across during a recent period of educational leave in that milieu.
4
  
The basic theory is that judges implement such a constitutional 
provision in two stages. The first involves a determination of the purpose 
of the provision. This is particularly apposite in Canada given the Court‟s 
early determination that it would take a purposive approach to Charter 
interpretation.
5
 The second is the development of doctrine in the form of 
rules or standards
6
 that courts should apply in future cases to determine 
whether the impugned government action — the subject of constitutional 
review — meets or falls short of the purpose to such an extent as to 
render it unconstitutional. I argue that this approach echoes in the reasons 
for judgment of Canadian judges in equality cases, especially as they 
wrestle, not so much with the purpose of the equality right, but with the 
                                                                                                             
2  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
3  British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
4  R.H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001), M.N. Berman, “Constitutional Decision Rules” (2004) 90 Va. L. Rev. 1 [hereinafter 
“Berman”], R.H. Fallon, Jr., “Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning” (2006) 
119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, at 1298 ff., L.G. Sagar, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American 
Constitutional Practice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), at 84-92, M.W.J. Smith, 
“Popular Metadoctrinalism: The Next Frontier?” (2007) 1 Harv. L. & Policy 507, K. Roosevelt, 
“Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does” (2005) 91 Va. L. Rev. 
1649, at 1658-67. 
5  Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 156 (S.C.C.). 
6  A rule is the simplest way of implementing a provision‟s purpose. A rule contains all the 
elements needed to determine whether that legal purpose is met. An example is that those who drive 
faster than 100 km per hour on a 100 km per hour highway are guilty of an offence. A standard 
contains a number of factors that require balancing a defined group of exogenous factors to 
determine whether the legal purpose is met.  
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standard by which it should be enforced.
7
 The theory posits that it is 
possible to separate purpose and doctrine so that an observer might be 
able to identify a gap, such that the stated purpose might be over- or 
under-enforced by doctrine. The idea is that this discrepancy may be 
adjusted over time, usually based on exogenous considerations that 
determine the proper fit between purpose and doctrine.  
I will discuss these considerations briefly because I think that this 
theory provides an interesting basis for thinking about the work of a 
judge, like Justice Bastarache, who in my view joined a Court that was 
quite clear about the purpose of section 15 all along, but that repeatedly 
stated after its 1995 equality trilogy,
8
 that there remained doctrinal 




One theorist‟s list of the considerations that may explain judicial 
choices of principle that might determine fit between purpose and 
doctrine contain the following. A legislative history of a failure to treat 
                                                                                                             
7  In Law, supra, note 2, at para. 2, Iacobucci J. wrote:  
Section 15 of the Charter guarantees to every individual the right to equal treatment by 
the state without discrimination. It is perhaps the Charter‟s most conceptually difficult 
provision. In this Court‟s first s. 15 case, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R 143, at 164, McIntyre J. noted that, as embodied in s. 15(1) of the 
Charter, the concept of equality is “an elusive concept”, and that “more than any of the 
other rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter, it lacks precise definition”. Part of 
the difficulty in defining the concept of equality stems from its exalted status. The quest 
for equality expresses some of humanity‟s highest ideals and aspirations, which are by 
their nature abstract and subject to differing articulations. The challenge for the judiciary 
in interpreting and applying s. 15(1) of the Charter is to transform these ideals and 
aspirations into practice in a manner which is meaningful to Canadians and which 
accords with the purpose of the provision. 
8  Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Miron”]; 
Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Egan”]; Thibaudeau 
v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.). 
9  See, e.g., Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 
3 S.C.R. 624, at paras. 54, 58 (S.C.C.), where La Forest J. writes:  
In the case of s. 15(1), this Court has stressed that it serves two distinct but related 
purposes. First, it expresses a commitment — deeply ingrained in our social, political and 
legal culture — to the equal worth and human dignity of all persons. As McIntyre J. 
remarked in Andrews, at p. 171, s. 15(1) “entails the promotion of a society in which all 
are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally 
deserving of concern, respect and consideration”. Secondly, it instantiates a desire to 
rectify and prevent discrimination against particular groups “suffering social, political 
and legal disadvantage in our society”. 
. . . . . 
While this Court has not adopted a uniform approach to s. 15(1), there is broad agreement 
on the general analytic framework … 
See also Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 73 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Vriend”]. 
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certain groups according to their merits and defects in democracy, such 
as a group‟s political powerlessness, might lead to doctrine that enforces 
a stricter application of constitutional purpose. However, judicial 
recognition of superior legislative institutional competence, for example, 
in information gathering and concern for higher costs of judicial error, 
for example, a decision that requires constitutional rather than simply 
statutory amendment, might increase deference and decrease fit between 
purpose and doctrine. A broad purpose might lead to a doctrinal choice 
of standards of increasing complexity, rather than a rule, as the best 
vehicle for adjusting doctrine to purpose, but perhaps at a cost of greater 
uncertainty in outcomes and an impact on the relative ease with which 
the doctrine can be applied by lower courts and government officials.
10
 
This implementation theory has developed in the American context and 
the example often used for showing a gap between purpose and doctrine 
in the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws which merges 
right with justification, there being no relevant equivalent to section 1 
and which, for most applications, with the notable exception of race, and 
some intermediate scrutiny grounds such as sex, demands rather little of 
the government by way of justification. Justice Bastarache took an 
interest not only in equality doctrine, but in the special section 1 
justification concerns raised by section 15.  
In the study of his equality jurisprudence that follows, we can see a 
strong resolve to develop, within the Law standard, the principle that the 
distributive power of the law should be used to ensure that groups that 
have been the victims of non-merit-based decision-making in the past are 
treated according to their merits. So, I will argue, his reasoning typically 
builds on what he perceives to be a clear gap between a characteristic of 
the claimant and proper allocation of the benefit in issue. He builds his 
highly contextualized approach to section 1 justification on a fully 
theorized balance between the institutions of judge and legislator that he 
tailored to section 15.  
Perhaps the most important reason for introducing this theory is that 
it provides a discourse for discussing the perception that the courts‟ 
decisions on equality matters fall far short of the potential suggested by 
the purpose of a right that instantiates the expectation of equal concern 
and respect for all members of society and actual outcomes in equality 
cases. 
                                                                                                             
10  K. Roosevelt, The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making Sense of Supreme Court Decisions 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), at 22-36. See also Berman, supra, note 4, at 92-96.  
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II. THE ROLES OF JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS 
Section 15 cases often involve broad questions of social policy. The 
role of the judge and any constraints on it is particularly important in this 
context.  
Justice Bastarache spoke extra-judicially about the role of judges in 
applying standards and values that he thought should override the will of 
Parliament when they define the “underpinnings of a modern, free and 
democratic society”,
11
 implying that Parliament, as an institution established 
by the Constitution, must operate according to constitutional rules. 
Speaking judicially, he wrote that one of these principles that underlies 
the proper functioning of our democracy is egalitarianism that should 
“promote electoral fairness by creating equality in the political discourse”.
12
 
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop,
13
 a section 15 case, he 
joined the Court in saying that “[i]t is true that this Court has the final 
word on the interpretation of the Constitution.”
14
 However, he also 
clearly stated that the Court did not change constitutional purpose, but 
that the outcomes of its constitutional interpretations did: 
The implication is that the right of same-sex spouses not to be excluded 
from survivor benefits did not form part of the Constitution until 1999. 
To put it bluntly, s. 15(1) of the Charter did not extend to same-sex 
couples until this Court said it did. I note that my colleagues are not 
simply saying that this Court‟s interpretation of the Constitution had 
changed between 1985 and 1999. If that were the case, it would be 
sufficient to base their denial of retroactive relief solely on the good 
faith reliance of the government. Instead, by relying on a critique of the 
declaratory theory and the “living tree” doctrine, my colleagues assert, 
in essence, that the Constitution actually changed between 1985 and 
1999 and that the claimants, unlike other Canadians, were not entitled 
to its protection in 1985. Such an approach runs counter to the spirit of 
the Charter and should not be countenanced.
15
  
I think that this strong statement, that constitutional interpretations 
change but the Constitution does not, is indicative of Justice Bastarache‟s 
clear understanding of the realities of constitutional implementation in 
                                                                                                             
11  M. Bastarache, “The Interpretation of Human Rights: The Challenge” (2001) 50 
U.N.B.L.J. 3, at 6 [hereinafter “ „Interpretation of Human Rights‟ ”].  
12  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at para. 
63 (S.C.C.). 
13  [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
14  Id., at para. 156, echoing the majority of the Court, at para. 111. 
15  Id., at para. 146. 
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recognizing that changes in the sensitivities of constitutional doctrine to 
exogenous influences, such as objective changes in social context, will 
close some gaps between constitutional purpose and doctrine over time.  
Throughout his time on the Supreme Court bench, Justice Bastarache 
was concerned about allegations of judicial arbitrariness and activism. I 
will discuss how this influenced his section 15 and particularly his 
section 1 analysis as I discuss his decisions. However, extra-judicially, 
he argued that the constraints of legal text, precedent, judicial respect for 
its proper function,
16
 a limitation of analysis “to the requirements of a 
rational basis for the legislative choice”,
17
 common law incrementalism, 
the rules of statutory interpretation, stare decisis, the principles applied 
to categories of decisions in the past, Charter rights themselves and new 
sources of legal inspiration, such as the decisions of foreign courts, all 
would allow the courts to develop the law and control judicial activism.
18
 
But only the Court would be able to determine whether these 
considerations achieve the proper balance between the judiciary and 
legislature.
19
 Interestingly, for the theory that I am advancing, he writes 
that the Court is not free to simply “rewrite the law to secure the 
effective implementation of the Charter”.
20
 However, the context of this 
statement is that judges cannot simply do whatever they want. And, 
while admitting that judges have to define the moral and ethical 
standards of society in which their beliefs, experience, ideals and values 
come into play and that judges have a law-making role that is as old as 
the common law, he adds that judicial accountability comes in the form 
of public reason-giving, the process of legal decision-making, “the 
reality of judicial precedent”,
21
 and contextual and purposive analysis. 
He denied that there were ideological camps in the Court
22
 and spoke 
against the over-simplification in court-watching that translated into easy 
categorization of judges.  
                                                                                                             
16  Supra, note 11, at 4. 
17  Id., at 6. 
18  Id., at 10. 
19  Id. 
20  Id., at 4. 
21  M. Bastarache, “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 56 
U.N.B.L.J. 328, at 329-30 [hereinafter “ „Decision-Making‟ ”]. 
22  Id., at 333. 
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III. SOCIAL JUSTICE 
A few months after his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice 
Bastarache was asked to speak extra-judicially about affirmative action 
as an instrument of social justice.
23
 While the speech was rather open-
ended, I think that it demonstrates a strong sensitivity to equality issues. 
He contrasted “individual” and “social” justice theories. The former was 
a negative right to the removal of barriers to individual benefit based on 
personal characteristics. The latter concerned justice to disadvantaged 
groups based on the distributive power of the law and the idea that such 
groups often needed more than the negative right, but rather positive 
accommodation to overcome past injustice. He tentatively suggested that 
section 15(2) indicated an aggressive social justice model.
24
  
On another occasion, he expressed his concern with the impact that 
the predictive ability of genetic testing would have on blurring “the line 
between merit and discrimination based simply on identity”
25
 and 
wondered how “such perfect knowledge [could] be squared with the 
principle that we all should be treated with equal respect”.
26
 This not 
only negatively impacted equality but also had the “capacity to reduce 
autonomy by quantifying risk to perfection”.
27
 His views about equality 
and liberty, as I shall try to point out, synchronize well with the classical 
liberal nature of the values instantiated in the Charter.  
Justice Bastarache may have been influenced in this contrast between 
individual and group-based social justice by his strong engagement with 
language law which is collective by its nature. The Court had earlier held 
that minority language education rights in section 23 of the Charter were 
group rights.
28
 In R. v. Beaulac
29
 he held that the principle of substantive 
equality is the norm for Canadian law and for the equality of the official 
languages in section 16 of the Charter.
30
 This might explain the sometime 
                                                                                                             
23  M. Bastarache, “Does Affirmative Action Have a Future as an Instrument of Social 
Justice?” (1997-1998) 29 Ottawa L. Rev. 497.  
24  Id., at 501-502.  
25  M. Bastarache, “The Challenge of the Law in the New Millennium” (1997-1998) 25 
Man. L.J. 411, at 417. 
26  Id.: “Law is largely dedicated to protecting a sphere in which hope is possible, in which 
crushingly rational — or supposedly rational — decisions are prevented from shattering the 
legitimate aspirations of individuals, even if they appear futile.” 
27  Id. 
28  Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] S.C.J. No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, at 365, 369 (S.C.C.). 
29  [1999] S.C.J. No. 25, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768 (S.C.C.). 
30  Id., at para. 22: “Equality does not have a lesser meaning in matters of language. With 
regard to existing rights, equality must be given true meaning. This Court has recognized that 
substantive equality is the correct norm to apply in Canadian law.” and id., at para. 24: “This 
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tension between individual and collective interests in his equality cases. 
Extra-judicially, he contrasted the American and Canadian approaches to 
human rights: “[i]ndividual rights are at the centre of their political 
philosophy while we balance individual and collective rights.”
31
 
IV. THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 15(1) 
Approaching this examination of the work of Justice Bastarache in 
implementing the equality right, I think that we must start with the 
original determination of section 15‟s purpose. He joined the Court 
almost a decade after McIntyre J. stated the basic purpose of the equality 
right for the Court in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,
32
 
which was to ensure that all members of society “are secure in the 
knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally 
deserving of concern, respect and consideration”.
33
 The Court thought that 
this was to be achieved by the accommodation of relevant individual and 
group difference, so that all members of society obtained the same value 
of the benefits provided by the law and bore the same burdens of the law. 
“Substantive equality”
34
 soon became part of the Court‟s lexicon.  
                                                                                                             
principle of substantive equality has meaning. It provides in particular that language rights that are 
institutionally based require government action for their implementation and therefore create 
obligations for the State”, citing s. 15 equality jurisprudence. Similarly, in Arsenault-Cameron v. 
Prince Edward Island, [2000] S.C.J. No. 1, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 31 (S.C.C.), he wrote:  
… the object of s. 23 is remedial. It is not meant to reinforce the status quo by adopting a 
formal vision of equality that would focus on treating the majority and minority official 
language groups alike; see Mahe, supra, at p. 378. The use of objective standards, which 
assess the needs of minority language children primarily by reference to the pedagogical 
needs of majority language children, does not take into account the special requirements 
of the s. 23 rights holders. The Minister and the Appeal Division inappropriately 
emphasized the impact of three elements on equality between the two linguistic 
communities: duration of the bus rides, size of schools and quality of education. Section 
23 is premised on the fact that substantive equality requires that official language 
minorities be treated differently, if necessary, according to their particular circumstances 
and needs, in order to provide them with a standard of education equivalent to that of the 
official language majority. Before examining this issue in more detail, however, it is 
important to deal briefly with the “numbers warrant” analysis which was discussed in 
both the trial and appeal divisions. 
31  Supra, note 21, at 331. 
32  [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”]. 
33  Id., at 171. 
34  According to a CanLII search of Supreme Court cases, this term was apparently used for 
the first time by L‟Heureux-Dubé J. in dissent in Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 
S.C.R. 695, at 786 and 820 (S.C.C.) and Vriend v. Alberta, supra, note 9, at para. 82, per Cory J. 
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But recognizing that of all the distinctions in the law, only 
discriminatory distinctions in the law breached section 15, McIntyre J. 
offered a definition of discrimination also still in use today:  
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, 
whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal 
characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of 
imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or 
group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to 
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of 
society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an 
individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely 
escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an 
individual‟s merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.
35
 
V. ANDREWS‟ DOCTRINE 
Justice McIntyre in Andrews summarized the doctrinal standard to 
implement section 15(1): 
The … “enumerated and analogous grounds” approach most closely 
accords with the purposes of s. 15 and the definition of discrimination 
outlined above and leaves questions of justification to s. 1. However, in 
assessing whether a complainant‟s rights have been infringed under 
s. 15(1), it is not enough to focus only on the alleged ground of 
discrimination and decide whether or not it is an enumerated or analogous 
ground. The effect of the impugned distinction or classification on the 
complainant must be considered. Once it is accepted that not all 
distinctions and differentiations created by law are discriminatory, then 
a role must be assigned to s. 15(1) which goes beyond the mere 
recognition of a legal distinction. A complainant under s. 15(1) must 
show not only that he or she is not receiving equal treatment before and 
under the law or that the law has a differential impact on him or her in 
the protection or benefit accorded by law but, in addition, must show 
that the legislative impact of the law is discriminatory.
36
 
After Andrews, the Court went through a period of adjusting its doctrine 
to implement section 15, focusing mainly on two strains of discrimination. 
One strain focused on the impact of the law on already disadvantaged 
groups, based on the idea that governments had often acted on falsely 
                                                                                                             
35  Supra, note 32, at 174. See recently R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 
483, at para. 18 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]. 
36  Id., at 182.  
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ascribed personal characteristics leading to the perpetuation of group 
disadvantage and prejudice. The second strain concerned distinctions 
based on merit that were less likely to be discriminatory. These included 
various accommodations of the needs of disadvantaged groups.
37
 Both 
strains are found in McIntyre J.‟s section 15(1) application of doctrine.
38
 
VI. THE PRE-LAW EQUALITY CASES OF JUSTICE BASTARACHE 
Justice Bastarache voted with the majority in his first equality case as 
a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend v. Alberta,
39
 where 
the Court held that the failure of the Alberta legislature to protect 
individuals based on their sexual orientation offended the equality right 
and could not be justified. Justice Cory applied the “enumerated and 
analogous grounds” approach whereby a distinction on a ground was 
almost presumptively discriminatory.
40
 I think that it is fair to say that 
Vriend was the high-water mark of this approach as the last major 
equality case before Law.  
The next case in which a section 15 issue was raised was Vancouver 
Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R.,
41
 in which 
                                                                                                             
37  R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.) (murder; accused not a 
disadvantaged group for s. 15 purposes); R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.) (statutory rape not sex discrimination because the actus reus in the crime against 
young women different from similar crimes against young men); Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 81, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 (S.C.C.) (female searches of male prisoners not 
sex discrimination because circumstances of female prisoners different from males); Eaton v. Brant 
County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) (child not subject to 
disability discrimination where decision-maker took her full circumstances into account); R. v. 
Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) (mentally disabled accused not discriminated 
against on ground of disability when forced to go through second trial on insanity if they do not raise it at 
trial because no one may be convicted without mens rea); R. v. S. (S.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 66, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 254 (S.C.C.) (young offender not discriminated against on basis of place of residence because he 
lived in a province that validly opted out of a federal diversion scheme). 
38  Supra, note 32, at 183. The Court, including Bastarache J., confirms the dichotomy in 
Kapp, supra, note 35, at paras. 18, 77.  
39  Supra, note 9. 
40  Id., at para. 91: 
It has been noted, for example by Iacobucci J. in Benner, [1997] S.C.J. No. 26, [1997] 1 
S.C.R. 358, at para. 69, that: “Where the denial is based on a ground expressly 
enumerated in s. 15(1), or one analogous to them, it will generally be found to be 
discriminatory, although there may, of course, be exceptions: see, e.g., Weatherall v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872.” It could therefore be assumed that a 
denial of the equal protection and benefit of the law on the basis of the analogous ground 
of sexual orientation is discriminatory. Yet in this case there are other factors present 
which support this conclusion. 
41  [1999] S.C.J. No. 5, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10 (S.C.C.). 
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Bastarache J. joined with the majority reasons written by Iacobucci J. He 
rejected a systemic discrimination argument that the laws governing the 
registration of charities discriminated against visible minority women by 
withholding registration of the claimant corporation thereby limiting its 
ability to raise funds for members of the group. His reasoning was that 
the purposes of the corporation did not meet the uniform definition of 
charitable purposes and so the personal characteristics of its intended 
beneficiaries were not engaged.
42
  
VII. LAW AND THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 15  
Justice Bastarache was a member of the Court when it decided that 
the way to implement the equality right to equal care and concern was 
through a complex standard.  
As noted above, the Law Court restated the purpose of section 15 
slightly:  
to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through 
the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social 
prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal 
recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, 




This restatement drew together a number of disparate considerations that 
the Court had used to implement section 15 now under a generalized 
concern for human dignity. 
VIII. LAW AND SECTION 15 DOCTRINE 
The Law standard incorporated the enumerated and analogous 
grounds approach, but attempted to unpack the definition of 
discrimination from Andrews
44
 to capture the two strains of 
discrimination identified in that case in a complex standard meant for 
judicial application. The new doctrinal “synthesis”
45
 involved the 
addition of a subjective-objective assessment by an informed reasonable 
claimant of whether the government action was an affront to basic 
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human dignity considering the two strains. Presumably, the idea was to 
add to the standard, a doctrinal mechanism that would aid courts in 
identifying the real harm of discrimination comprehensively as a dignity 
harm captured by four contextual factors that can be grouped according 
to the two strains of discriminatory action described above.
46
 The first 
was a concern with the perpetuation of disadvantage of an already 
disadvantaged group in society, the amelioration of such disadvantage 
and the seriousness and nature of the action‟s effect on the group. 
Second, the reasonable claimant was also to take into account whether 
the action was based on merit: whether it corresponded to the actual 
nature, capacities and circumstances of the claimant group. In later cases, 
Justice Bastarache seemed moved to write reasons where this second 
concern was most descriptive of the equality harm as he saw it. These 
factors thus balanced the Andrews Court‟s concern with both the 
perpetuation of the conditions of disadvantaged groups together with the 
government‟s failure to consider their merits in the impugned distinction. 
The Law Court expanded on its doctrinal view that section 15 was a 
comparative right by increasing analytical attention to the choice of 
comparators.  
For the remainder of his time on the Supreme Court bench, Justice 
Bastarache worked with his colleagues in applying the Law standard, 
until he agreed with his colleagues at the end of his term essentially to re-
package the discrimination analysis and dump the legal dignity criterion 
in Kapp.  
IX. JUSTICE BASTARACHE‟S OWN EQUALITY DECISIONS  
Justice Bastarache wrote that his first authored concurrence in an 
equality case, M. v. H.,
47
 was driven by his difference with the majority 
about the purpose of the impugned law that provided for support on the 
breakdown of opposite-sex relationships.
48
 His reasons start with his 
acknowledgment that judges were to apply the law and not dabble in 
policy in matters, especially where “emotions run high”.
49
 With this 
statement of the judge‟s constitutional role and by engaging in an 
unquestioned application of the recently synthesized Law standard, he 
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48  Id., at para. 287. 
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appears to be following his views discussed above as a judge embracing 
principles that advanced the fundamental ideals of liberty and equality 
within the proper judicial confines. His section 15 reasoning is terse and 
comes right to the point: the text of the family law support law blocked 
same-sex couples from accessing a legal procedure provided to 
unmarried opposite-sex couples when their relationships broke down. 
This failure of correspondence of law to group need was arbitrary and 
suggested that same-sex unions were not worthy of recognition or 
protection and was therefore discriminatory.
50
 The implementation of 
constitutional purpose by a strict application of established doctrine 
seemed simple.  
Justice Bastarache‟s interest in developing section 15 doctrine is seen 
in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs),
51
 
released the same day as M. v. H., in majority reasons co-written with 
McLachlin J. (as she then was). Section 77(1) of the Indian Act
52
 limited 
the right of band members to vote for the band council to those who lived 
on reserve. The two justices sought to clarify the nature of the second 
step of the Law standard concerning grounds in two ways: its role as a 
threshold step in the Law standard and that the grounds, whether 
enumerated or analogous, are “… constant markers of suspect decision 
making or potential discrimination”.
53
 Analogous grounds become 
constitutionalized once recognized. The justices thought that because 
grounds identify the types of claims that should be subject to the third 
step of the standard, their use as a threshold avoided a waste of judicial 
resources on trivial cases falling outside section 15‟s purpose.
54
 The two 
justices define the considerations for identifying analogous grounds 
based on what they have in common with the enumerated grounds:  
It seems to us that what … [enumerated] grounds have in common is 
the fact that they often serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions 
made not on the basis of merit but on the basis of a personal 
characteristic that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost 
to personal identity … grounds based on characteristics that we cannot 
change or that the government has no legitimate interest in expecting us 
to change to receive equal treatment under the law. To put it another 
way, s. 15 targets the denial of equal treatment on grounds that are 
                                                                                                             
50  Id., at para. 291. 
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Concern with group disadvantage became a predicate to a concern with 
the way that governments have historically treated groups without regard 
to their merit: 
Other factors identified in the cases as associated with the enumerated 
and analogous grounds, like the fact that the decision adversely impacts 
on a discrete and insular minority or a group that has been historically 
discriminated against, may be seen to flow from the central concept of 
immutable or constructively immutable personal characteristics, which 




The repetition of the merit-based decision-making point suggests 
their strong leaning toward the intuition that the law should accord with 
the actual needs and circumstances of individuals. The fact that 
disadvantage has resulted from non-merit-based decision-making based 
on these characteristics seems to suggest that they thought that to base 
law on merit would overcome barriers to equal benefit flowing from past 
disadvantage. I think that this slight change in doctrinal emphasis 
broadened the scope of section 15 to potentially include claims of non-
disadvantaged groups who also suffer from non-merit-based decision-
making based on their immutable personal characteristics. In Corbiere, 
“Aboriginality-residence”,
57
 in the sense of living on- or off-reserve, was 
important to Aboriginal identity and not easily changed. They wrote that 
this approach to analogous grounds allowed courts to focus on particular 
forms of discrimination by defining “embedded” grounds.
58
 They clearly 
identified the third step of the Law standard as the locus of analysis of 
the facts of a particular case. There was a quick mention of the 
disadvantage suffered by off-reserve band members followed by their 
main move to focus on the logical driver of the finding of discrimination: 
off-reserve band members had an interest in the land, culture and 
resources of their reserve in common with on-reserve members and so 
they should have an equal right to democratically chosen representation 
in Band affairs. The impugned law failed to deal with the merits of off-
reserve members; it denied them the right to participate in Band 
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elections, arbitrarily based on a personal characteristic: it presumed that 
they were not interested in political participation and their cultural 
identity. It deprived them of their dignity. They went further: even if the 
off-reserve Band members had freely chosen to live off-reserve and were 
not subject to discrimination in Canadian society, “they would still have 
the same cause of action”.
59
 They would still be deprived of their 
political and cultural rights. Once again, the law simply did not 
correspond to need and so was discriminatory. Equal concern and respect 
was to be achieved then in this case, by recognizing that the Law 
standard consisted of a structured focus by means of a comparison based 
on grounds relating to immutable characteristics, on disadvantage or on 
the logic of failure to accord law to need.  
I think that Bastarache J.‟s plurality reasons in Lavoie v. Canada
60
 
served as another opportunity to fine-tune the doctrinal framework of the 
Law standard, apparently trying to fit the Andrews reasoning on the same 
issue — a citizenship requirement for employment — into the recently 
synthesized vocabulary of the new standard. As in Corbiere, he 
emphasized the purpose of the first two steps of the equality standard as 
a legal threshold for the third step where the specific effects of the 
impugned law are analyzed from the perspective of the reasonable 
claimant. He applied the Andrews determination that citizenship is an 
analogous ground without question. There was no room for deference or 
doubt on this point. On a novel point, he was not willing to reject the 
claim at the threshold stage based on a federalism argument that the 
Constitution grants the federal government the unassailable right to 
define the rights of citizens in the same way that section 6 allows it to 
distinguish between citizens and non-citizens for immigration purposes 
in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli.
61
 He 
affirmed that the purpose of a Bill of Rights was to analyze differential 
treatment here in terms of equality rights and not in terms of division of 
powers, so a comparison of groups based on jurisdictional considerations 
at the threshold stage was inappropriate. However, he ventured that 
federal laws based on “alienage”
62
 might survive the third contextual 
stage of the Law standard, lumping Law itself in with this genre of case. 
Presumably he meant that a distinction on a ground in a federal law may 
not be discriminatory if the distinction in the law on a ground is dictated 
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by the constitutional division of powers. It is interesting that in R. v. 
S. (S.),
63
 which he does not mention in Lavoie, the Court held that the 
discriminatory potential of provincial differences in the application of a 
provincial young offenders program was eliminated at what would, under 
the Law standard, be the third stage, by reference to federal values.
64
  
The issue of discrimination in Lavoie was governed by Andrews. 
Justice Bastarache stated that the Court‟s earlier finding that non-citizens 
were a disadvantaged group was final and binding for the future.
65
 
Presumably this is to be consistent with his shared reasoning in Corbiere 
that analogous grounds are grounds for all time and all purposes and 
what I think was meant by the idea of embedded grounds as an indication 
that they were to be sharply focused, unlike the broad enumerated grounds. 
The close connection between historical patterns of disadvantage and 
analogous grounds that made the grounds useful markers for further 
scrutiny would be disrupted if the factual finding of the disadvantaged 
nature of the group varied from case to case. He used the “suspect 
markers”
66
 vocabulary again, almost inferring that distinctions on such 
grounds were presumptively discriminatory,
67
 leaving the ultimate 
determination of discrimination to the third stage of the Law standard.  
Once again, Bastarache J. emphasized the requirement that the law 
correspond to the merits of the claimant group in comparison to the 
merits of others. He crossed swords with Marceau J. in the court below 
who, he writes, accepted the principle that federal citizenship-defining 
laws would not be discriminatory because the use of federal legislative 
jurisdiction over citizenship rights and status in this case did not 
discriminate against non-citizens. Justice Bastarache had a different view 
of whether this correspondence was a proper merit-based argument. He 
traced the origin of the concern that the law correspond with group need to 
the principle of accommodation of the needs of the disabled and women to 
achieve substantive equality.
68
 He generalized that this was to ensure that 
governments accommodate the particular situation of those affected by 
their actions, including any relative advantage or disadvantage.
69
 This 
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included, it seems, disability and gender as difference based on “actual 
personal differences between individuals”.
70
 However, in this case, 
citizens and non-citizens were similar in their “sociological, economic, 
moral, [and] intellectual”
71
 merits. Citizenship was only a legal status 
which this law need not accommodate. Further, the distinction perpetuated 
the disadvantage of non-citizens without taking their merits into account 
in the same way as in Andrews and did not ameliorate their lot.  
One of the most interesting doctrinal developments in Bastarache J.‟s 
Lavoie reasons lies in his elaboration of the objective-subjective 
viewpoint of the reasonable claimant from which distinctions must be 
evaluated according to the Law standard. He borrowed carefully from the 
terminology of the Law case, in saying that what the viewpoint idea 
requires is a contextualized look at how a non-citizen “legitimately feels 
when confronted with a particular law”.
72
 In one of the most empathetic 
applications of the reasonable claimant test by the Court, he wrote that 
even though a non-citizen would probably recognize that the citizenship 
preference in issue had nothing to do with his or her own merits, he or 
she might still feel less worthy of the government‟s respect and 
concern.
73
 In making the point that the section 15 and section 1 analyses 
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. . . . . 
Although the trier of fact engages in a subjective interpretation of the communicated 
message to determine whether “hatred‟ was indeed what the speaker intended to promote, 
it is not enough that the message be offensive or that the trier of fact dislike the 
statements: Keegstra, at p. 778. In order to determine whether the speech conveyed 
hatred, the analysis must focus on the speech‟s audience and on its social and historical 
context. An abstract analysis would fail to capture the speaker‟s real message. 
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should not be elided, he nuanced the required judicial stance when he 
wrote that the “… subjective view must be examined in context, that is, 
with a view to determining whether a rational foundation exists for the 
subjective belief”
74
 and not by balancing individual and state interests. 
Justice Bastarache refused to acknowledge that the focus on dignity 
made the section 15 test amorphous.
75
  
The Lavoie case also shows an interesting contrast between 
Bastarache J.‟s working within the established equality standard and 
Arbour J.‟s attempted re-conception of equality doctrine, where she 
attempted to embrace a tension between the comparative concerns of the 
groups involved on the one hand and the public interest on the other, 
involving what she theorized as a bilateral nature of rights.
76
 Justice 
Bastarache rejected this re-conception on various grounds. Contrary to 
Arbour J.‟s position, he wrote that public policy reasons should not 
undermine an equality claim. Such balancing should not be done within 
the right without the sort of textual mandate of section 7. Her approach 
departed from earlier section 15 jurisprudence. Also, her focus on the 
disadvantage of the individual claimants as opposed to the group with 
which they are associated by a personal characteristic could be invidious 
in other cases.  
I think that Bastarache J.‟s strong commitment to the doctrinal 
principle of the need for correspondence between law and reality is seen 
most clearly in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh,
77
 in which he 
wrote for the majority of the Court, holding that the exclusion of 
opposite-sex unmarried couples from the matrimonial property scheme in 
Nova Scotia family law did not breach section 15. He readily accepted 
the concession of the Crown that the exclusion was differential treatment 
on the analogous ground of marital status established in Miron, noting 
the finding of McLachlin J. (as she then was) in that case that distinctions 
between married and unmarried couples were based on that ground 
because they violated dignity, imposed group disadvantage and created 
the danger of stereotypical group-based decision-making.
78
 However, in 
Walsh, Bastarache J. thought that the examination of the issue must be 
based on the merits of the relationships involved. The driver for him was 
that the Court could not presume that unmarried couples entered their 
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relationship accepting all of the legal obligations of marriage. Proof of 
functional similarities between married and non-married couples was not 
very relevant in this context. Rather, there was a fundamental difference 
between these classes and even within the class of unmarried couples 
itself, in the freedom that the latter group had to choose how to structure 
their relationships economically. He accepted that unmarried couples 
have suffered historical disadvantage, including the fact that they might 
not have a real choice to get married where one of the partners refuses, 
citing a discussion in Miron where L‟Heureux-Dubé J. notes the fact that 
the lack of choice is often illusory.
79
 However, his focus is on the fact, 
also noted in Miron by L‟Heureux-Dubé J., that many unmarried couples 
choose to avoid the legal consequences of marriage (while her point had 
been that a focus on “unfettered choice”
80
 alone could disadvantage 
women).
81
 He thought that bringing the power of the state to bear by 
forcing a matrimonial regime on unmarried couples nullified their choice 
of an alternative family form and to have that choice respected by the 
state. Further, the legislative record and associated case law showed that 
the matrimonial regime was meant to remedy the wrongs inflicted in the 
past on women in a separate property regime by recognizing marriage as 
an economic partnership and by protecting a non-title-holding spouse. He 
was concerned that the weighty burden of the scheme for married 
couples should not be placed by the state on unmarried couples who 
might not want it because they still had numerous ways of duplicating 
the matrimonial regimes for themselves if they wanted to by marriage, 
domestic contract or registration as domestic partners. Thus, in the 
matrimonial property law there was correspondence of law to the choice 
of married couples and to the liberty created by the range of choice 
available to unmarried couples to decide how to deal with their property. 
Unlike Miron, which dealt with third-party state treatment of married and 
unmarried couples, this case concerned the relationship of the parties 
between themselves. The key point was that Bastarache J. thought that 
choice, a function of the autonomous liberal legal subject, trumped 
whatever disadvantage existed within unmarried couples. He thought that 
this was consistent with the liberty value underlying the Charter.
82
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Justice Bastarache dissented in the controversial case of Gosselin v. 
Quebec (Attorney General),
83
 in which a class of welfare recipients under 
30 complained that the workfare conditions that were imposed on them 
to obtain the welfare benefits received by those over 30 plunged them 
into deepest poverty. In opening his section 15 analysis, he once again 
demonstrated his interest in the function of grounds within section 15, 
which are often used as an “illegitimate proxy for merit”.
84
 Unlike other 
judicial conceptions of age discrimination that are based on the 
deferential idea that such discrimination is unlikely because we all pass 
through all ages, he thought the issue was not so simple. Rather, he 
thought that age should not be the subject of deference because large age 
cohorts might still discriminate against smaller ones based on changing 
circumstances over time.
85
 Once again working within the doctrine of 
section 15, he clarified that a distinction on a ground does not create a 
presumption of discrimination, but rather a “strong suggestion”.
86
 The 
legislation here had to be examined in light of its purposes and effects.  
Unlike the members of the majority, he thought that the impugned 
distinction should be considered in the welfare context, where the facts 
showed that it was not as easy for those under 30 to right themselves 
economically as the younger group of claimants in Law and that the 
government‟s creation of the program in issue showed that it was aware 
of this, even though there was no evidence that younger persons on 
welfare have traditionally been disadvantaged. The welfare context made 
the affected group more disadvantaged than others on the same ground.
87
  
Justice Bastarache found the lack of correspondence between law 
and need compelling, while noting that this inquiry should not displace a 
section 1 inquiry. The program did not ameliorate the condition of those 
under 30.
88
 Focusing once again on the driving logic of the case, he 
found that the beneficial long-term purpose of the program simply did 
not outweigh its effects in failing to deal with the present need of all 
welfare claimants for minimum support.
89
 Legislative difference can only 
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be supported by genuine difference between claimants and beneficiaries: 
this was not present when considering the real position of those under 30 
who had the same needs as those over 30. The potential difference 
between the groups based on the assumption that more of those under 30 
lived with their parents was unsupported. The fact that the evidence 
showed that the presumptions guiding the legislature were factually 
unsupported and historically out-of-date, resulting in serious detriment to 
those affected, made it unnecessary to show actual stereotyping. A 
beneficial governmental purpose could not save the scheme. He felt that 
the class action authorization, based on proof of a group harmed on the 
same facts, should satisfy the need for proof of group disadvantage. He 
wrote that the inquiry into the scope and nature of the effect on the 
claimant should focus on the claimant and not the societal interests that 
the legislature was trying to secure because they were section 1 concerns. 
Here the issue of survival for the claimant was fundamental and one 
known by the government, and it was not trumped by a secondary long-
term goal of improving self-sufficiency for the claimant group. He 
disagreed with the Chief Justice, who had used the deferential argument 
from Law that correspondence between law and need does not have to be 
perfect, by finding that the discrepancy in this case was far in excess of 
what the Law standard would tolerate.
90
 
Justice Bastarache broached some broader concerns about constitutional 
doctrine. He theorized the difference between the effect of legislative 
under-inclusion in the analysis of the comparative section 15 right and 
the analysis of the non-comparative section 7 right (though he ultimately 
rejected the section 7 argument because the case did not engage the 
administration of justice).
91
 The comparative nature of the section 15 
equality right ensures that an improperly excluded group obtains the 
benefit that a proper comparison with another group shows that it should 
get. This analysis differed from the non-comparative right. He used the 
example of the non-comparative right to freely associate in section 2(d) 
that he had dealt with in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)
92
 and 
earlier in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General)
93
 to explain. He 
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had said in Dunmore that where a state specifically designs legislation to 
safeguard a constitutional right, under-inclusion that substantially 
impedes the exercise of that right by an excluded group may require a 
positive constitutional remedy. This was not present in Gosselin‟s case.
94
 
In his view, the government distinction did not substantially interfere 
with the claimant‟s right to security of the person because the workfare 
elements of the program assisted in finding work and could provide 
additional benefits.
95
 The higher benefit for those over 30 did not reduce 
the potential of those under 30 to exercise their right to security of the 
person. The focus of the non-comparative right was on the group‟s 
ability to access the constitutional right, not to better benefit from the 
statutory scheme: that was the job of section 15. Although ultimately 
finding that the welfare scheme was unconstitutional, he refused to join 
in Arbour J.‟s attempted re-writing of the Court‟s doctrine on section 7. 
In Hislop,
96
 Bastarache J. concurred in the Court‟s finding the 
exclusion of survivors of same-sex couples from the Canada Pension 
Plan
97
 contrary to section 15. Justices LeBel and Rothstein for the 
majority held that the Court should limit the retroactive effect of its order 
because of the substantial change in its position in M. v. H.
98
 from its 
ruling in Egan,
99
 where the Court held that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples did not breach the Charter. Justice Bastarache thought that the 
denial of retroactive relief, a long-standing legal principle, was inappropriate 
in Charter cases, and that the normal remedial considerations should 
apply. Conflict with the Charter invalidated a law and:  
By attaching importance to changing social conditions, it makes 
Charter rights dependent on how the majority of Canadians perceive 
the claimants‟ rights. With respect, I cannot see why society‟s views of 
Charter claimants — especially in the context of vulnerable minorities 
— should be a factor for determining whether a Charter right was part 
of the Constitution in 1985, or whether it sprung into existence later 
and thereby be a basis for denying retroactive relief.
100
  
In his view, Egan was not a sea change in the process of determining 
the status of same-sex relationships under the Constitution that ended 
                                                                                                             
94  Supra, note 83, at para. 220. 
95  Id., at para. 221. 
96  Supra, note 13. 
97  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8. 
98  Supra, note 47. 
99  Supra, note 8. 
100  Supra, note 13, at para. 143. 
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) EQUALITY LAW 363 
abruptly with the recognition of these relationships in M. v. H. Rather, he 
saw the Court‟s jurisprudence as part of a larger process by which the 
Court determined “the correct constitutional principles to be applied to 
legislative exclusions of same-sex couples”.
101
 Constitutional remedies 
were important. Nevertheless, reasonable reliance on the Court‟s earlier 
rulings, fairness to litigants and respect for Parliament‟s role and its good 
faith move to legislatively remedy the issue across federal statutes and 
policies after M. v. H. were important considerations in determining 
Charter remedies. In the end he agreed with his colleagues in limiting the 
retroactive effect of the remedy. While he was obviously unhappy from a 
principled Charter viewpoint, he felt compelled to acknowledge some of 
the realities of modern government.  
X. BALANCING RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT 
Some cases show that Justice Bastarache‟s usual choice of liberal 
principles to advance the values of human dignity, liberty and equality 
was tempered with principles that supported traditional or collective 
social values. His approach in two cases shows him to make rational 
choices consistent with a pluralistic, liberal society.  
He wrote the majority reasons of the Court with Iacobucci J. in 
Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers,
102
 
rejecting a decision of the British Columbia College of Teachers refusing 
to approve a proposal of Trinity Western to take full responsibility for its 
teacher training program. The refusal was based on the perception that 
graduates of the Trinity Western program would not be able to teach in a 
diverse school system because all members of the evangelical program 
had to subscribe to standards prohibiting biblically condemned practices, 
such as homosexual behaviour, that the College found discriminatory and 
contrary to its public policy mandate. Justices Bastarache and Iacobucci 
wrote that the issue at the heart of the appeal was how to reconcile the 
religious views of the Trinity Western community with the equality 
concerns of students, parents and society in the British Columbia public 
school system.
103
 That was to be done by delineating the scope of the 
rights involved.
104
 They drew the line between belief and conduct. There 
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was no evidence of discriminatory conduct by a Trinity Western graduate 
or of a related future risk to the school system. Future discriminatory 
conduct would be subject to sanction by the College in any event. The 
College had acted on irrelevant considerations and its decision was 
overruled.  
In a more traditionalist vein, he signed on to the dissenting reasons of 
Gonthier J. in Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36,
105
 who held 
that it was reasonable for a local school board to refuse to allow teachers 
to use three books aimed at portraying children of same-sex couples as 
morally acceptable families to children in kindergarten and grade one. 
The local school board had weighed the views of many parents who did 
not want their young children exposed to views contrary to their religious 
beliefs. Justice Gonthier emphasized the primacy of parental right in 
determining the moral development of children. He balanced parental 
and religious rights with what he thought to be a vague case of 
discrimination: the children would learn about human sexuality when 
necessary and, in any event, in later grades.  
XI. SECTION 15 AND CONFLICT WITH ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
Kapp
106
 was a prosecution of non-Aboriginal claimants who alleged 
in their defence that the extra 24 hours given to Aboriginal fishers under 
the Aboriginal Fishing Strategy breached their equality rights in the 
context of the commercial fishery. Justice Bastarache concurred with the 
majority in its modifications to the Law standard and in the result that the 
claimants‟ argument should be rejected.  
However, he based his reasons for decision on an argument that 
shows a collectivist orientation: that section 25 provided a complete 
answer to the section 15 claim on the ground that the Aboriginal fishery 
was “another right” pertaining to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. In 
his view, section 25 is a shield against the application of the Charter 
where it would diminish the distinctive, collective and cultural identity of 
an Aboriginal group.
107
 It is not absolute, in that it is subject to sexual 
equality in section 35(4) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
108
 Further it 
applies only where Charter rights conflict with Aboriginal rights. Thus, 
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only laws impairing native rights will be affected and not those with only 
incidental effects on Aboriginal people.
109
 He also notes that section 25 
rights are not constitutionalized and can be taken away, presumably 
referring to “other rights”.
110
 Generally, “other rights” would include a 
significant amount of law: 
Laws adopted under the s. 91(24) power would normally fall into this 
category, the power being in relation to the aboriginal peoples as such, 
but not laws that fall under s. 88 of the Indian Act, because they are by 
definition laws of general application. “[O]ther rights or freedoms” 
comprise statutory rights which seek to protect interests associated with 
aboriginal culture, territory, self-government, as mentioned above, and 
settlement agreements that are a replacement for treaty and aboriginal 
rights. But private rights of individual Indians held in a private capacity 
as ordinary Canadian citizens would not be protected. 
. . . . . 
The inclusion of statutory rights and settlement agreements pertaining 
to the treaty process and pertaining to indigenous difference is consistent 
with the jurisprudence of this Court.
111
  
Applying the purpose-doctrine approach to implementing the 
Constitution, having determined that this is the purpose of section 25, 
Bastarache J. then considers the doctrine needed to implement it: 
There are three steps in the application of s. 25. The first step requires 
an evaluation of the claim in order to establish the nature of the substantive 
Charter right and whether the claim is made out, prima facie. The 
second step requires an evaluation of the native right to establish whether it 
falls under s. 25. The third step requires a determination of the existence of 
a true conflict between the Charter right and the native right.
112
  
Justice Bastarache found a prima facie breach of section 15(1) 
because a benefit was conferred on Aboriginal people not given to non-
Aboriginal fishers. This established a conflict with an Aboriginal right. 
He then found that the early start given to Aboriginal fishers in the 
licence is an “other right” for section 25 purposes. It was founded on the 
unique connection between Aboriginal communities and the fishery. 
These had been the subject of litigation and treaty right and were part of 
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the reconciliation of interests in the Aboriginal Fishing Strategy.
113
 He 
also found a traditional basis for resolving constitutional conflicts by 
noting that the right in question was “totally dependent on the exercise of 
powers given to Parliament under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 
1867”
114
 to legislate for the benefit of Indians, which cannot be overridden 
by section 15 of the Charter. This was a real conflict between this “other 
right” and section 15 of the Charter to which the latter gives way. 
However, the majority had the last word on section 25, at least to the 
extent of undermining the definitive position taken by Bastarache J. But 
to the extent that his reasons demonstrate a choice of principles that 
protect group rights, we might find that consistent with the group nature 
of the linguistic rights that so engaged him.  
XII. SECTION 1 
Justice Bastarache pursued his interest in the deeply contextual 
nature of section 1 analysis in a lengthy exegesis of the factors that apply 
in justification of breaches of section 15 in M. v. H. His highly principled 
approach to justification appears to be driven by his view, stated at the 
outset of his section 1 reasons, that the case involved more than the status 
of same-sex couples in the family law regime, but the broader question 
of the scope of deference to legislative policy-making as determined by 
his theory of the relationship between judge and legislator. He was quite 
aware that the law-making task of both the legislatures and the courts in 
some areas could be perceived as “an irreducible struggle”.
115
 However, he 
was confident that the courts were to carry out their duties in cooperation 
and dialogue with the legislature. That cooperation created responsibilities 
for judges, that meant that the courts owed legislatures an exacting 
examination of both its subjective intent and its law‟s social context.  
His section 1 reasons in M. v. H. commence with a warning that the 
important issue of deference to legislative choice cannot be determined 
by the simple dichotomization of legislation into that which pits the state 
against the individual versus that which mediates the interests of various 
groups in society. Rather, it requires an exegetical probe of the 
contextual factors that have to be considered in determining the issue of 
deference. The intensity of his inquiry shows just how important he 
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thought the question of deference was to the proper constitutional role of 
the judiciary when it sat in judgment on legislative policy: too much 
deference underemphasized the judicial role in determining the legal 
question of constitutionality, while too little deference could demonstrate 
a constitutionally unwarranted judicial hegemony. He returned to this 
theme after his review led him to the conclusion in M. v. H. that section 1 
should be applied strictly, without deference. He stated that a careful 
examination of the legislators‟ subjective intent is the way to minimize 
the judicial intrusion into the role of the legislature to express the will of 
the community and that judges must ensure that the democratic will of 




Justice Bastarache‟s section 1 reasons in M. v. H. also show his 
underlying respect for the basic Enlightenment liberal principles that 
undergird Charter rights.
117
 He is concerned about the cost in autonomy 
of the mandatory legislative imposition of marital obligations on couples 
who have not chosen to assume them by marriage (while noting that this 
option was not open to same-sex couples at the time). At the same time 
he is concerned about the inequality arising in gendered relationships and 
those left out of relevant family law.  
His section 1 analysis starts with an objective examination of the 
social context of the impugned legislation. With a warning that judges 
should take care when relying on social science evidence, he concludes 
that its preponderance shows that same-sex relationships do not create 
the power imbalance characteristic of opposite-sex relationships. However, 
at the same time, he notes that there is a growing recognition of the 
family status of same-sex relationships in society and in government 
policy and the prevalence of discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
His description of the context of the legislation then leads to a 
determination of what he considered the initial section 1 question: how 
much should the courts defer to the legislature based on contextual 
considerations?
118
 Justice Bastarache had earlier emphasized the importance 
of looking at this question first in order to know what type of proof 
should be expected from the government, as well as being relevant to all 
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of the parts of the judicial duty to apply the Oakes justification standard.
119
 
In M. v. H., he states that the point of this inquiry into deference is to 
determine whether, in the face of evidence showing that same-sex 
relationships do not usually create gender inequality, but do in some 
cases, the Court has to accept the legislature‟s decision about whom to 
include in the family support regime or whether it can proceed to remedy 
the problem as it appears from the social context of the law. Thus, his 
concern with deference seems to be deeply rooted in his conception of 
the proper resolution of the court/legislature dialogue model.  
Justice Bastarache then embarks on a closer look at the deference 
issue in the substantive equality context, considering many of the factors 
that are discussed above in connection with the theory about how judges 
implement constitutional meaning through doctrine, in this case, the 
Oakes standard‟s purpose of determining whether breaches of the 
Charter are justified. Ultimately, his view that the Court need not defer to 
legislative choice in M. v. H. was based on a number of such factors. The 
nature of the interest affected was fundamental. He accepted the 
argument that the exclusion of same-sex couples perpetuated their legal 
invisibility, though he does suggest that the best solution to the support 
issue for them would be legislation that better corresponds to their needs 
and expectations.
120
 This is an interesting example of how important the 
distributive power of the law was in requiring the correspondence of law 
to group need for Bastarache J. The vulnerability of the group is another 
factor, which could be ambiguous in some cases suggesting deference, 
but was not in this case. The complexity of the overall issue of making 
normative social changes based on a recognition of same-sex couples 
suggested more deference: who is in the best place to make the decision 
from an institutional perspective? He recognized that the issue before the 
Court was only a small piece in a much larger web of family law in 
which judicial tinkering might bring about unfortunate unintended 
consequences. This increased the potential cost of judicial error. 
However, in this case, he thought that the issue of support obligations for 
same-sex couples was severable from the larger legislative web. Further, 
there were no particular administrative or financial priority-setting issues 
that might weigh in favour of deference to the legislature based on 
institutional competence concerns. Interestingly, he suggests that the 
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governmental decision-making process affects deference: the more open 
and democratic the process, the more deference it is presumptively 
entitled to. In this case, however, the legislative record showed no 
democratic consideration given to the right of this group to equal concern 
and respect. His final consideration was the role of the legislators‟ moral 
judgment in social policy. He thought that moral judgment might favour 
supporting the traditional family in some cases: a peek at his thinking 
about what might be considered conservative principles. However, any 
internal tension that this might have created for Bastarache J. was not a 
factor here, because he thought that the ascription of status to same-sex 
couples did not create any hardship for traditional families and, in fact, 
supported family formation.  
Justice Bastarache‟s conclusion that little deference was due to the 
legislators in this case meant that the Oakes
121
 standard should be applied 
strictly. As noted above, this meant judges owed legislators significant 
effort in attempting to determine their subjective legislative purpose. 
Judges had to carry out a careful review of the legislative record and the 
resulting legislation. “The perspective must be that of the political 
actor.”
122
 He thought that this was particularly true in section 15 cases 
where legislative action may be based on contested social phenomena, 
misapprehensions of the circumstances of a group or antipathy towards 
it. However, the possibility that these factors might have been present in 
the minds of legislators — factors that would undermine any justification 
of discrimination — meant that there should be an additional, objective 
element to the examination of legislative purpose, which would be found 
by a careful examination of the social context of the impugned 
legislation. Presumably, he thought that this would identify the zone of 
contestation between legislative intent and any gap between it and social 
reality as well as any misapprehensions or antipathies about or toward 
the excluded group. Because of the potential existence of gaps between 
legislative intent and social reality, he concluded that where the 
subjective and objective narratives of purpose and need are “manifestly 
inconsistent”
123
 — presumably where legislators have failed to explore 
and properly respond to the social environment of their legislative action 
within their zone of deference because of these considerations — then 
subjective legislative history should give way to objective social reality.  
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Digging deeper, he noted that determining the legislative purpose for 
the impugned legislation in any given case may be difficult in section 15 
cases especially because the legislators‟ purpose for creating the legislative 
scheme as a whole may not disclose why the claimant group was 
excluded. A judge had to determine not only the purpose of the overall 
legislative scheme — particularly important in section 15 cases because 
it will rarely be discriminatory itself
124
 — but also the purpose of the 
impugned omission, which is the real limitation of rights to be justified. 
Because of the relational nature of the two purposes, the legislative 
history should be examined as precisely as possible to ascertain both 
purposes. He notes that failure to find the legislators‟ purpose for the 
impugned exclusion could mean a failure of the rational connection 
element of the section 1 justification test, unless that purpose could be 
logically deduced from the overall purpose. I think that because 
Bastarache J. was so concerned in his thinking on section 15 about the 
correspondence of the law to need, he thought that there would naturally 
be a tension between the overall purpose and the exclusion that would 
lead to a failure of rational connection.  
His concern with the care that should be taken in determining the 
legislative purpose in M. v. H. showed in Bastarache J.‟s unhappiness 
with the Court of Appeal‟s determination of legislative purpose. He 
thought it oversimplified. The purpose had been reduced by that court to 
the recognition of intimate relationships and the avoidance of a drain on 
the public purse. He thought that a closer look was needed because this 
did not offer a justification for the legislation as it focused on only one of 
the characteristics of the class benefited by it. In his view, the primary 
purpose of the legislation demonstrated by the legislative debates was 
remedying the economic disadvantage of women in common law 
relationships and subsidiarily remedying their economic position and 
their resort to public assistance.
125
 He referred to the concurring reasons 
of McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Miron that referred to the same 
disadvantage.
126
 The fact that the text of the legislation allowed men to 
apply for support was due to the desire of the government to use gender-
neutral language and not to extend the right to sue for support to 
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everyone in intimate relationships. Evidence of male dependency was 
lacking. A look at the entire legislative structure, including other related 
statutes, showed its purpose was to deal with the traditional family 
(apparently including opposite-sex common law partners): the equality of 
spouses, the protection of children and parents. The family scheme fit 
into a broader web of family-oriented statutes dealing with the traditional 
family.  
However, his careful review of legislative history did not reveal any 
evidence that the legislators turned their minds to a specific purpose for 
excluding same-sex couples. It disclosed only a concern for gender 
inequality in “traditional” relationships, not for economic inequality in 
all intimate relationships. The lack of consideration given to same-sex 
couples suggested that the legislators did not consider them families in 
the traditional sense. That and the failure of proposed amendments that 
would have extended these rights to same-sex couples
127
 was evidence 
that the original purpose concerning gender inequality was the real, 
subjective purpose of the legislators. Presumably this was evidence of 
either a failure of democracy or a misapprehension of social needs.  
The evidence did show that women and children were still 
vulnerable in common law relationships and that the number of children 
in such relationships was increasing. Overall, he thought that there was a 
pressing and substantial purpose for protecting women and children in 
traditional and gendered non-traditional families of some permanence.
128
 
But in his view, the justification for this limited intervention “affecting 
the autonomy of heterosexual couples”
129
 did not justify the exclusion of 
all other family relationships. The government‟s purpose for the under-
inclusion, which he summarized as excluding classes not generally 
suffering gender imbalance suggesting no need to limit their 
autonomy,
130
 was not rationally connected to the objective of achieving 
the “objective of eradicating economic dependency within families”.
131
 
There was no evidence that the inclusion of same-sex relationships 
would cause difficulties. Thus, there was no pressing and substantial 
objective for the exclusion of same-sex couples who experienced the 
same need as opposite-sex relationships, though in reduced numbers.
132
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Justice Bastarache‟s strong commitment to the equality principle in the 
Charter led him to ask whether the purposes of the exclusion were 
consistent with that principle.
133
 They were not.  
Also, throughout his section 15 decisions, he insisted on the need to 
keep the section 15 and section 1 analyses separate. He wrote in Lavoie:  
By contrast, the government‟s burden under s. 1 is to justify a breach of 
human dignity, not to explain it or deny its existence. This justification 
may be established by the practical, moral, economic, or social 
underpinnings of the legislation in question, or by the need to protect 
other rights and values embodied in the Charter.
134
 
XIII. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 
The right to equality in Canada is enforceable against both private 
and public bodies through human rights legislation found in every 
jurisdiction prohibiting discrimination in employment and services.  
The Supreme Court has dealt with many jurisdictional issues 
recently, steadily expanding the number of bodies that can apply human 
rights legislation, increasing access to anti-discrimination prohibitions. In 
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program),
135
 
Bastarache J. wrote that “in Charette
[136]
 I noted how allowing many 
administrative actors to apply human rights legislation fosters a general 
culture of respect for human rights in the administrative system”.
137
 In 
Tranchemontagne, he held that a Social Benefits Tribunal had the 
exclusive power to apply the Ontario Human Rights Code
138
 to determine 
whether social assistance legislation was in conflict with the Code 
rendering certain of its provisions inoperative in the case. He developed a 
complex argument for finding that the provision of the legislation that 
says that the Tribunal cannot decide the constitutionality of legislation 
did not oust the effect of the Code‟s primacy provision because the latter 
did not result in a constitutional review but in a matter of statutory 
interpretation, determining which statute shall apply in a given situation. 
In Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
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jeunesse) v. Québec (Attorney General)
139
 he wrote for the dissent, 
arguing that the exclusive arbitral jurisdiction over grievances given by 
legislation in Quebec meant that an arbitrator rather than a human rights 
tribunal should deal with a complaint of discrimination about the terms 
of a collective agreement. In Charette,
140
 he wrote for a majority, holding 
that the Quebec legislature had given the Commission des affaires sociales 
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with an allegation of discrimination in 
entitlement conditions for social assistance benefits and not the human 
rights tribunal.  
In Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net
141
 
he wrote the majority reasons for holding that the Federal Court of 
Canada had the power to issue an interim injunction to prevent the spread 
of hate messages under the Canadian Human Rights Act
142
 pending the 
final disposition of the case by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.  
On substantive matters, he wrote joint reasons with Iacobucci J. in B 
v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission)
143
 reasoning that the concept of 
marital and family status in the Ontario Human Rights Code
144
 was broad 
enough to cover the situation where an individual‟s employment was 
terminated because of allegations his wife and child made about his 
employer, his wife‟s brother. They reasoned that human rights legislation 
protects individuals from discrimination based on grounds which in B 
were relational by their very nature. Drawing on the purpose of section 
15 doctrine, they refined and related the individual and collective nature 
of the right to be free of discrimination. In applying their theory to facts, 
they found that the termination based on family identity regardless of the 
merits as “precisely the kind of conduct which the Code aims to prevent”.
145
  
Justice Bastarache also wrote the reasons for the majority in Honda 
Canada Inc. v. Keays,
146
 a wrongful dismissal case that engaged principles 
of the Code. Keays was terminated after failing to meet with Honda‟s 
doctor, who had been engaged to evaluate his chronic fatigue syndrome 
after the employer became concerned that his own doctor‟s notes did not 
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satisfactorily explain his lengthy absences from work. The case focused 
on the damages issue. The trial judge had held that the employer had 
breached the Code, which was an actionable wrong that supported 
punitive damages. However, Bastarache J. upheld the ruling in Seneca 
College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria
147
 that discrimination 
did not create a common law cause of action, but that claims of 
discrimination were comprehensively dealt with in the Code and did not 
create an actionable wrong. He also found that the trial judge erred in 
finding that requirement to provide doctor‟s notes as part of the 
accommodation program that permitted disabled employees to take 
longer, excusable time off was discriminatory. He also accepted that the 
need to monitor the absences of employees who were regularly absent 
was a bona fide work requirement based on the nature of the employment 
contract to provide work for payment.
148
 Showing the pragmatic side of 
judging, while upholding long-standing anti-discrimination law principles, 
he found others tempered by the terms of basic employment contracts in 
the workaday world.  
XIV. CONCLUSION 
In the equality field, Justice Bastarache was a lawyer‟s judge. He 
worked within established legal doctrine to refine it to bring it closer to 
his perception of the demands of the Charter. His perception of the 
equality right and the power of the law as an instrument of distributive 
justice led him to strongly favour the principle that the law should 
correspond to the actual needs of the legal subject. He tended to find a 
key driver for his findings of discrimination such as the failure of 
democratic representation in Corbiere,
149
 the failure to provide for the 
needs of same-sex couples on the breakdown of their relationship in M. 
v. H.
150
 and the lack of connection between merits and citizenship 
preference in Lavoie.
151
 His rulings adhered strongly to the classical 
liberal principles of liberty and equality. The claim of discrimination in 
marital property division rules was trumped by the liberal concern for 
individual autonomy of the members of a common law relationship in 
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Walsh.
152
 At the same time that he acknowledged the principles by which 
the law supported the traditional family, he distanced himself from the 
concept of community responsibility that would have found same-sex 
couples to be a threat to the hegemony of the opposite-sex family. He 
saw the need for a highly contextualized approach to the justification of 
breaches of section 15 in applying section 1 in a way that seems to have 
been based on a well-theorized conception of the constitutional roles of 
judges and legislators. He wrote that substantive equality is the norm for 
the interpretation of Canadian law.  
His anti-discrimination cases tended to extend the jurisdiction of 
tribunals to apply these laws with the expected result that it would foster 
a climate of respect for human rights. He arrived at a logical extension of 
the grounds of marital and family status that had been latent in the law 
for some time, while accepting some legal and pragmatic limits on their 
scope.  
Overall, he was a judge who advanced the values of the Charter 
within a well-thought-out conception of how our democracy works. 
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